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In this article the author explores in detail the “unforeseen developments” requirement 
in the Agreement on Safeguards under the WTO. The author seeks to answer questions 
such as whether the requirement (i.e., unforeseen developments must be demonstrated 
in order for safeguard measures to be justified) is an integral part of the Agreement on 
Safeguards, and how the subjectivity associated with this requirement contributes to 
the difficulty of constructing a reasoned and adequate account of the causal chain. The 
article also includes within its scope a brief analysis of larger issues such as the 
political and economic rationale behind safeguard measures, and how ambiguities in 
the Agreement on Safeguards can destabilize the discipline of safeguards and defeat 
one of its major purposes – to help countries nurture their infant industries. Finally, the 
article reflects upon how India, being one of the leading users of safeguard measures as 
of 2008, is likely to be affected by unclear areas in the present legislation such as the 
unforeseen developments clause.   
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Introduction 
t is one of the foundational principles of the international trading system under the 
World Trade Organization that member countries are bound by their negotiated 
concessions for imports, unless these concessions are modified according to the 
existing rules. The essentiality of this principle for the stabilization of the international 
trading system as well as for further promotion of trade cannot be overemphasized. It 
may, therefore, appear to pose a fascinating paradox that the same agreement that 
seeks to promote international trade allows WTO members to backtrack and place 
restrictions on imports in the form of safeguard measures in the case of an increase in 
such imports.
1 
The justifications for safeguard measures that WTO members have come up with 
from time to time have attracted controversy. These measures are at their core meant 
to be instruments for use in times of emergency, and have been identified as such in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947. Safeguards are temporary 
in nature, explicitly designed to slow imports in order to enable a particular domestic 
industry to adjust to heightened competition from foreign suppliers.
2 The term 
“safeguards” is generally used to denote government actions in response to imports 
that are deemed to harm the importing country’s economy or domestic competing 
industries. These mechanisms often assume import-restraining forms, whether they 
are increased tariffs, quantitative restrictions, or other measures.
3 Article XIX of the 
GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards (AS) authorize members to impose import 
restrictions, in the form of either tariffs or quotas, to prevent or remedy serious injury 
to domestic industry when such injury is caused by an increase in imports.
4 Safeguard 
measures, unlike other measures such as those relating to antidumping, have to be 
imposed on the basis of the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle.
5 
In this context, mention must be made of the two distinct motives suggested by 
Hoekman and Kostecki for including safeguard measures in the GATT/WTO system, 
viz. as insurance and as a safety valve. The insurance motive reflects that without such 
provisions, governments may be reluctant to sign trade agreements leading to 
substantial liberalization. The inclusion of an escape clause in said agreements may 
thus facilitate liberalization of trade by encouraging negotiators to be bolder while 
making their offers of concessions. The safety valve motive, on the other hand, 
portends that governments may at a subsequent point in time feel pressure to renege 
on certain negotiated liberalization commitments. By legalizing some backsliding 
under carefully specified circumstances, an escape clause can thus be instrumental in 
protecting the integrity of the remainder of the agreement and therefore improve the 
overall durability of a liberal trade regime.
6 
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Since the inception of the AS, the number of safeguard measures adopted by 
member countries has seen a rather steep rise.
7 Prior to the AS, countries mainly used 
measures other than safeguards to accord protection that would have been otherwise 
inconsistent with the GATT. For instance, while developing countries often used 
balance-of-payments to impose protection and could also refer to the infant industry 
argument, developed countries, at the other end of the spectrum, used “grey-area 
measures” such as voluntary export restraints (VERs) to restrict imports. The use of 
tariff renegotiations was also another prominent way of protecting domestic industries 
prior to 1995. Therefore, Article XIX protection in the pre-1995 era tended to affect 
only a negligible amount of world trade in relatively minor product categories.
8 While 
Trebilcock and Howse have identified that most safeguard measures are imposed by 
the developed countries, which are able to flex their muscles in the global trading 
arena,
9 the latest reports from the WTO Safeguards Committee suggest changes in the 
scenario, with developing countries being at the helm of the majority of safeguard 
initiations.
10 In fact, India has become a leading user of safeguard initiations, with 15 
to its credit already as of mid-2008.
11 
There is no dearth of explanations that can be put forward to account for this shift. 
It is possible that the industries of developed countries, facing the fiercest of 
competition, have either become more efficient or simply disappeared and therefore 
no longer require safeguards. Another explanation, which is tinged with a deeper 
political hue, is that consumers in developed countries, who are negatively affected by 
safeguards, have become better organized at opposing safeguard requests from 
domestic industry. As regards the rise in the use of safeguards by developing 
countries, one idea is that these countries and their domestic industries have reached 
the desired level of technical proficiency so as to enable them to wield the tools of the 
WTO for imposition of safeguards. Since the number of developing nations easily 
exceeds that of the developed ones, therefore, all other factors being equal, it is 
expected that there would more safeguards imposed by developing countries than 
those imposed by the developed ones.
12 
However, despite this increase in the use of safeguard measures, what is thought 
provoking is that, to date, every single safeguard measure challenged before the WTO 
Appellate Body has been struck down for failing to meet the necessary requirements. 
A host of reasons have been put forward as possible explanations. While some argue 
that the AS itself is a flawed document, with very complex concepts that need review, 
others feel that it is not the AS but rather the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the AS 
that has rendered validation of a safeguard measure virtually impossible. Yet others 
are of the view that countries are applying safeguard measures irresponsibly and as a Tilottama Raychaudhuri 
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means of protectionism, which is why such measures cannot hope to achieve 
sustainability. Provided one assumes that the Appellate Body’s aversion to safeguard 
measures is not entirely the fault of the applying state, there appears to be 
considerable cause for worry, more so because if the present framework renders it 
technically impossible for a country to impose safeguards, then the very purpose of 
allowing an “escape clause” stands defeated.
13 
This article seeks to concentrate on one major hindrance to the imposition of 
safeguard measures, viz. the “‘unforeseen developments” clause. The language in 
which the words of Article XIX of the GATT and the AS are couched is fraught with 
ambiguity. First, the text of the AS imposes no requirement whatsoever for members 
to demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments. Further, though the 
Appellate Body has revived the unforeseen developments requirement, it has yet to 
state clearly how a causal link should be drawn between unforeseen developments and 
injury to the domestic industry.
14 The unforeseen developments clause is undoubtedly 
a cause for concern, more so because this requirement has not been met in any case 
under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. 
Unforeseen Developments: Article XIX and the 
Agreement on Safeguards 
he origin of safeguard measures can be traced to the “escape clause” of the 
United States Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1942 with Mexico.
15 Today, the 
heart of the escape clause is the first provision in Article XIX of the GATT. Paragraph 
1(a) of the said article states, 
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the 
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, 
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the 
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under 
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the 
contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent 
and for such time as may be necessary, to prevent or remedy such injury, to 
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the 
concession. 
Article XIX of the GATT therefore addresses circumstances in which unforeseen 
developments and the effect of GATT obligations result in increased quantities of 
imports, thereby either causing or threatening to cause serious injury. This is   
commonly referred to as the “unforeseen developments” clause. One cannot deny that  
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this requirement was quite comprehensible in the early days of the GATT; concessions 
hitherto unknown had been made in 1947 and there was an obvious possibility that 
such concessions might result in an unexpected import surge. Article XIX was 
designed to address those unforeseen and at times politically awkward consequences 
of the original GATT bargain. 
Nonetheless, the interpretation of the requirements of Article XIX, especially after 
the passage of so many years, attracts challenges. For instance, if one takes the 
example of an import surge decades after GATT had entered into force, could any 
such surge have been foreseen given the passage of so much time? By whom and at 
what time could it have been foreseen? With ongoing GATT negotiations and 
initiation of a new negotiating round every decade or so, does each round reset the 
clock on what is foreseen? The term “unforeseen developments” can thus no longer 
boast of a straightforward interpretation in an agreement that has lasted for decades 
rather than a few years and has been characterized by ever-changing commitments.
16 
The requirement that a GATT member using safeguard measures has to 
demonstrate unforeseen developments as well as the effect of GATT obligations used 
to be taken seriously in the early days of the GATT. Both these issues have been 
discussed in considerable detail in the Hatters’ Fur case,
17 which is a leading precedent 
on safeguards in the early days of the GATT. However, over the course of time GATT 
practice evolved to the point that members no longer paid much attention to textual 
requirements. In this context, one can refer to the example put forward by Sykes of the 
U.S. statute authorizing safeguard measures under domestic law, making no mention 
whatsoever of these issues, and the United States International Trade Commission 
(USITC), which administers the law, ignoring the same in the course of its safeguard 
investigations. There has been a notable dearth of GATT members ever bringing a 
complaint in this regard.
18 
By the time the Uruguay Round of negotiations had taken place, the unforeseen 
developments clause requirement posited by Article XIX had become little more than 
dead letters in GATT practice, which is evident from its conspicuous absence from the 
WTO Agreement on Safeguards. The text corresponding to Article XIX (1)(a) in the 
AS is Article 2.1, which simply states, 
A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that 
Member determined, pursuant to provisions set out below, that such 
product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, 
absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as 
to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that 
produces like or directly competitive products. Tilottama Raychaudhuri 
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Therefore, although Article 2.1 of the AS reiterates all other conditions of Article 
XIX, it makes no mention of the first part of paragraph 1 of Article XIX, that is, the 
unforeseen developments clause and the “effect of obligations incurred” requirement. 
Such omission from the otherwise parallel text hints that the Uruguay Round 
negotiators were content with them remaining little more than dead letters. However, 
the AS does not supplant Article XIX. On the contrary, at the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, GATT members withdrew from the old GATT treaty and the old 
GATT provisions were incorporated into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement as “GATT 
1994”. This incorporation signifies that the rules of the GATT comprise part of the 
WTO disciplines to the extent that there is no conflict with the new rules agreed in the 
Uruguay Round.
19  
Given such a scenario, the problem pertaining to the unforeseen developments 
clause appears to be two-fold. First, Article XIX of GATT 1994 requires that in order 
to adopt a safeguard measure, the competent national authority must demonstrate that 
an increase in imports has taken place due to unforeseen developments. In contrast, 
Article 2.1 of the AS makes no mention of unforeseen developments. If unforeseen 
developments create a condition for imposing a safeguard remedy, the two provisions 
are apparently in conflict. Second, no guidance has been provided as to what exactly 
constitutes an unforeseen development. This clause is not further elaborated or 
illustrated by examples either in Article XIX of GATT 1994 or in the AS. Its broad 
language is presumably meant to cover a wide range of unexpected circumstances, 
which by definition are difficult to anticipate precisely. 
Revival of the Unforeseen Developments Clause 
ne of the first cases to raise the question of unforeseen developments before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) was brought by the European 
Communities in 1997 against measures taken in the Korean dairy industry.
20 In 1998, 
the EC lodged another complaint against proceedings in the Argentine footwear 
industry.
21 A common question raised in both these cases was whether the unforeseen 
developments clause, which was specifically omitted from the AS, constitutes a legal 
requirement for the application of a safeguard measure. 
In the first case, the EC argued that the clause in question requires members to 
establish the existence of unforeseen developments that led to an increase in imports, 
although that clause is not found in the AS.
22 According to the EC, omission of the 
unforeseen developments clause from the AS was immaterial because the AS and 
Article XIX should be read cumulatively. The EC’s arguments, however, faced the 
objection that omission of the clause from the AS was intentional. Korea asserted that 
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there is a conflict between the provisions of Article XIX and the AS, in which case the 
latter should prevail.
23 The panel, however, found that Article XIX:1 is still generally 
applicable, and there is no formal conflict between the provisions of Article XIX:1 
and Article 2.1 of the AS.
24 However, it rejected the argument that the unforeseen 
developments clause creates any legal obligation, instead choosing to consider the 
clause to be an explanation of why a measure under Article XIX may be needed.
25 
In the Argentina – Footwear case, the EC came up with similar arguments and 
Argentina’s first line of response, like Korea, was to argue that the omission of the 
unforeseen developments requirement from the AS creates a conflict between the AS 
and Article XIX. In this case, the panel emphasized the express omission of the 
unforeseen developments requirement from the AS,
26 the fact that it was ignored in 
GATT practice, and that it would be unrealistic to assume that the practice of non-
enforcement of the unforeseen developments condition was unknown to the drafters of 
the AS.
27 Thus, the panel concluded that compliance with the requirements of the AS 
regarding the prerequisites for safeguard measures should also be deemed to have 
satisfied the requirement of compliance with Article XIX. 
The EC chose to appeal both the panel decisions. The Appellate Body rulings in 
the two cases were given on the same day and are almost identical on the issue of 
unforeseen developments. It was held that the text of GATT 1994 is part of the 
Uruguay Round package and is binding on all members. Furthermore, Article 11 of 
the AS states that no member may take safeguard measures “as set forth in Article 
XIX of GATT 1994 unless such action conforms with the provisions of that Article 
applied in accordance with this Agreement.” From this text, the Appellate Body 
inferred that the drafters of the AS had specifically affirmed the continuing vitality of 
Article XIX, and therefore Article XIX and the AS were to be read cumulatively. 
Moreover, it was also iterated that a treaty must give meaning and effect to all the 
terms of the treaty and an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in 
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.
28 In the 
view of the Appellate Body, the panel decisions had the effect of reading the text of 
the first clause of Article XIX out of existence, which stood in violation of this 
principle. Moreover, as to the suggestion of the panel in Argentina – Footwear that the 
express omission of unforeseen developments from the AS supported an inference that 
the drafters wished to eliminate it, the Appellate Body concluded that if the drafters 
intended to omit this clause the agreement would have expressly said so.
29 
The aforesaid decisions were instrumental in the complete revival of the first 
clause of Article XIX by the Appellate Body.
30 In the five safeguard disputes that have 
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failed to comply with the unforeseen developments requirement. Their stand has 
prevailed on the issue in four of five cases,
31 and in the remaining one matter the issue 
was not reached for reasons of judicial economy.
32  
Unforeseen Developments: Its Meaning 
o date, little guidance has been given as to what exactly constitutes an unforeseen 
development. So far, the only case where the unforeseen developments 
requirement was held to have been satisfied is the U.S. – Hatters’ Fur case, which 
concerned a measure taken by the United States against imports of women’s fur felt 
hats and hat bodies, challenged by Czechoslovakia.
33 
The Hatters’ Fur Case 
n October 1950, on the eve of the fifth session of the GATT in Torquay, England, 
the United States announced that it would be taking action pursuant to Article XIX 
of the GATT to protect domestic producers of women’s fur felt hats and bodies. The 
United States argued that, due to significant tariff reductions granted on these products 
by the United States in Geneva (1947), there had been a substantial increase in 
imports, which had caused injury to domestic producers. As a result, it chose to 
withdraw the tariff concessions made in Geneva and restore the level of protection 
previously available to domestic producers of the products in question. In effect, this 
resulted in imports being subjected to an import duty at an ad valorem rate between 
67.80 percent and 73.65 percent instead of between 25.3 percent and 41.8 percent.
34 
Pursuant to its obligations under Article XIX, the United States entered into 
consultations with several contracting parties who were affected by this course of 
action and managed to reach an agreement with each of these, with the sole exception 
of Czechoslovakia. At the Torquay meeting the Czechoslovakian delegation lodged a 
protest against the U.S. action, claiming that certain conditions of Article XIX had not 
been complied with. The complaint was referred to a specially appointed working 
party that deliberated on the matter and presented its report on March 27, 1951. 
In its argument, the United Sates had claimed that the change in hats’ fashion that 
had led to the increase in import of felt hats and hat bodies was “‘unforeseen”, 
particularly in view of its magnitude. The working party found for the United States. 
They concluded that “the fact that hat styles had changed did not constitute an 
‘unforeseen development’ within the meaning of Article XIX.”
35 However, they also 
concluded that “the effects of the circumstances indicated in the above, and 
particularly the degree to which the change in fashion affected the competitive 
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In an attempt to resolve the matter of the nature of such developments, it was also 
observed by the working party that 
… the term “unforeseen development” should be interpreted to mean 
developments occurring after the negotiation of the relevant tariff 
concession which it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators 
of the country making the concession could and should have foreseen at 
the time when the concession was negotiated ….
37 
It has since been oft-argued that the aforesaid definition of “unforeseen 
development”, as mentioned in this case, is a mixture of subjective and objective 
factors. The term “reasonable” suggests that an objectively reasonable person could 
not have expected the negotiators of the country concerned to foresee the development 
at the time the negotiation had taken place. However, the fact that the phrase 
“negotiators of the country making the concession” has been spelled out suggests this 
objectively reasonable person must put him or herself in the position of the negotiators 
of the country concerned and see matters from their unique perspective.
38 
Unforeseen Developments – Later Cases 
he issue of unforeseen developments arose once again in the WTO cases Korea – 
Dairy Products and Argentina – Footwear. In both these cases, the Appellate 
Body chose to reverse the panels’ decisions and affirmed that Article XIX of the 
GATT was in no conflict with the AS, since they applied cumulatively and were all 
provisions of one treaty, viz. the WTO Agreement.
39 While holding so, the Appellate 
Body also put forward some initial thoughts on the meaning of “unforeseen 
developments”, saying that the words should be examined in their ordinary meaning, 
in their context, and in light of the object and purpose of Article XIX. The literal 
meaning of the word “unforeseen” is synonymous with “unexpected”. Therefore, the 
phrase “as a result of unforeseen developments” requires that the developments that 
led to a product being imported in increased quantities and under such conditions as to 
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers must have been 
unexpected.
40 Furthermore, the Appellate Body did not find that the unforeseen 
developments clause in Article XIX of the GATT established any independent 
condition for the application of a safeguard measure; on the contrary, it was 
determined that the said clause describes certain circumstances that must be 
demonstrated as a matter of fact for a safeguard measure to be applied consistently 
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Nonetheless, it remains ambiguous from the Appellate Body’s decision as to what 
distinguishes an “independent condition” from “circumstances which must be 
demonstrated as a matter of fact”. In this respect, one could agree with Sykes that the 
rationale for this peculiar distinction between “conditions” and “circumstances” could 
be due to the title of Article 2 of the AS – which reads “Conditions”. The Appellate 
Body did not wish to suggest that unforeseen developments constituted a condition, 
since the list of conditions in Article 2 made no mention of them. However, since they 
are required to be demonstrated “as a matter of fact”, they ought to be considered as a 
condition for the use of safeguard measures for all practical purposes.
42 
Further, mention should be made of a distinction that has been made between the 
terms “unforeseen” and “unforeseeable”. In the Korea – Dairy Products case, the 
Appellate Body found that the latter term could be construed to imply a less stringent 
threshold than the former.
43 Subsequently, in the U.S. – Lamb case, the panel agreed 
with the Appellate Body’s reasoning.
44 Another debate that persists is whether the 
increase in imports themselves has to be unforeseen, or should the said increase be 
able to be attributed due to unforeseen developments. Although the Appellate Body in 
the Argentina – Footwear case said that “increased quantities of imports should have 
been unforeseen or unexpected”, no concrete commitment seems to have been made 
to the proposition that the extent of increase itself should have been unforeseen 
(especially because the Appellate Body subsequently went on to define “in such 
increased quantities”). 
In the view of the author, the determination of whether the requirement of imports 
“in such increased quantities” has been met with is not a merely mathematical or 
technical determination. In other words, it is not enough for an investigation to show 
simply that imports of the product this year were more than last year – or five years 
ago. Again, and it bears repeating, not just any increased quantities of imports will 
suffice. There must be “such increased quantities” as to cause or threaten to cause 
serious injury to the domestic industry in order to fulfill this requirement for applying 
a safeguard measure. And this language in both Article 2.1 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards and Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994, according to the author, requires that 
the increase in imports must have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, 
and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to 
cause serious injury.
 45 
Again, in the case of Argentina – Preserved Peaches,
46 the issue was whether the 
increase in world production was an unforeseen development. In this case, it was 
shown that world production in 1999-2000 was less than one percent higher than that 
in 1992-1993, which was the season of the Uruguay Round. In response to the panel’s Tilottama Raychaudhuri 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   312 
 
query as to why the Argentine negotiators could not foresee or rather notice this 
development, Argentina argued that what escaped the foresight of its negotiators was 
that this increase in world production would become a rule rather than an exception. 
However, the report of the competent authority did not have any mention that the 
increased level of world production had become a rule rather than an exception. 
Therefore, the panel had little choice other than to hold that Argentina had not met its 
obligation under Article XIX:1(a).
47 
Demonstration of Unforeseen Developments 
hile the decisions in the Argentina – Footwear and Korea – Dairy Products 
cases demonstrated that the AS “clarified and reinforced” Article XIX of 
GATT, these decisions, significantly, did not examine when, where, or how the 
demonstration of unforeseen developments should occur. In fact, in the U.S. – Wheat 
Gluten case, in the interest of judicial economy the panel saw no need at all to deal 
with the unforeseen developments clause.
48 
In the U.S. – Lamb Meat case, the United States devised a new argument against 
the requirement that there ought to be a showing of unforeseen developments under 
Article XIX in order to apply safeguard measures. The United States argued that it 
was unnecessary for the competent authority to reach a specific conclusion finding 
unforeseen developments; as long as the said authority has developed a factual basis 
demonstrating unforeseen developments, as was the situation in that particular case, 
the conclusion does not have to be presented in the report. The author, in this respect, 
would like to point out that the obvious rationale for such an approach seems to be as 
follows: at the time of the determination, the respective panels and Appellate Body in 
the Argentina – Footwear and Korea – Dairy Products cases had not reintroduced the 
unforeseen developments pre-condition for safeguards measures, which had been 
dormant for at least three decades.
49 The United States, relying on the 1951 Hatters’ 
Fur GATT panel decision,
50 suggested that specific developments in the marketplace 
leading to an injurious import surge will not normally be “foreseen” by negotiators at 
the time of making tariff concessions. Once the competent authority has provided a 
factual basis for a finding of unforeseen developments, the complaining parties have 
the burden of proving that the factual basis is insufficient, and here they had failed to 
do so. 
In the U.S. – Lamb Meat case, the Appellate Body addressed the issue of “when” 
and “where” the demonstration of unforeseen developments should occur, but once 
again avoided deciding the matter of “how”. As to the aforesaid questions of “when” 
and “where”, since a determination of whether a development is unforeseen or not is a 
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prerequisite for the imposition of safeguard measures, it logically follows that the 
demonstration has to be made before such measures are applied, that is, in the 
competent authority’s report.
51 In the case under consideration, however, the same did 
not occur, since the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) did not 
consider the matter of unforeseen developments at all. The Appellate Body noted that 
the USITC report in the U.S. – Lamb Meat case was completed seven months before 
the Appellate Body reports in the two aforementioned cases, viz. the Argentina – 
Footwear case and the Korea – Dairy Products case, had been circulated, which could 
also explain why the USITC’s report omitted to address the issue of unforeseen 
developments. Regardless, these considerations can scarcely be regarded as a valid 
excuse.
52 The Appellate Body clarified that the published report of the competent 
authority, in this case the USITC, must contain a finding or reasoned conclusion on 
unforeseen developments. This finding having been made, the Appellate Body again 
deftly sidestepped the substantive issue as to what was required for a showing of 
unforeseen developments.
53 
Thus, it remains unclear from the Appellate Body decisions as to what exactly 
constitutes an “unforeseen development”. Even in later cases like U.S. – Steel 
Products,
54 the Appellate Body failed to clarify the meaning of this clause, instead 
repeating the position that the United States must demonstrate that unforeseen 
developments were the cause behind the increase in imports, as well as the resultant 
injury. 
Problems with This Clause 
mongst the several complications associated with the discipline on safeguards, 
perhaps the most problematic aspect is the addition of a legal requirement that is 
not explicitly mentioned in the Agreement on Safeguards. First, as Lee argues, the 
unforeseen developments clause is too ambiguous to be considered as an objective 
legal requirement.
55 In the Hatters’ Fur case, the working party report stated that the 
term “unforeseen developments” should be interpreted to mean developments 
occurring after the negotiation of the relevant tariff concession and which it would not 
be reasonable to expect the negotiators of the country making the concession to have 
foreseen at the time when the concession was negotiated. According to this 
interpretation, the “foreseeability” of those developments should act as the requisite 
standard to determine the existence of “unforeseen developments”. Again, to 
understand the foreseeability, one has to determine the point in time at which the 
relevant tariff concession was negotiated. At the time of the Hatters’ Fur case, it was 
easy to determine the same, as there had been only one negotiating round in 1947. 
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However, many of the tariff concessions now in place within the WTO were 
negotiated under the GATT and are decades old.
56 Many were also modified over a 
series of GATT negotiating rounds. In such instances, a void continues to exist as to 
the criteria necessary to determine the relevant point in time for assessing 
expectations. 
Second, negotiations on tariff reductions broadly take place in accordance with 
either of the following two approaches: product-by-product negotiation based on 
requests and offers among countries, and reduction based on some general formula or 
principle for an across-the-board tariff cut, also commonly known as the formula 
approach.
57 In the first GATT rounds, tariffs were cut on a selective, product-by-
product basis through requests and offers made between participants. However, 
subsequent contracting parties decided to use formulas to cut tariffs across the board. 
In the Ministerial Declaration in Hong Kong, the members decided to adopt the Swiss 
formula for further tariff reduction. Given such circumstances, it is difficult to assume 
that a country’s commitment to tariff reductions reflects a considered opinion on its 
part that the trade scenario with regard to any particular product among hundreds 
would remain the same or undergo modifications. Therefore, it will certainly be 
oversimplification to make a presumption that a negotiator is always minutely 
analyzing world production and trade trends and only then bargaining and making a 
commitment according to the classical comparative advantage model. In the nerve-
wracking bargaining process involved, there is little scope and independence for a 
country to analyze the trade trend of each of its products. Therefore, to say that 
“unforeseen developments” means unexpected developments after the tariff 
concessions are granted, renders the entire procedure of proof to the realm of the 
hypothetical, without any relation to the realities of the bargaining process under the 
WTO.
58 
Third, the addition of such a requirement does not appear to be at all consistent 
with the intent of the negotiators in the Uruguay Round. In fact, a perusal of the 
negotiating history reveals that the draft version of the AS did contain the unforeseen 
developments clause. By mid-1990, however, the clause was omitted from the draft, 
while other conditions of Article XIX were repeated almost verbatim. Therefore, it is 
only reasonable to conclude that this omission was intentional. Moreover, the 
preamble to the AS also indicates the intent of the Uruguay Round negotiators to this 
effect, while recognizing the AS to be a comprehensive agreement.
59 
Finally, the requirement of unforeseen developments does not seem to serve much 
of a useful purpose. It is highly unlikely that any member would have granted import Tilottama Raychaudhuri 
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concessions had they foreseen any developments that would lead to serious injury or 
threat thereof to their domestic industry. 
How Great Is India’s Concern? 
ndia is at present one of the leading users of safeguard measures among the WTO 
member states, having adopted the highest number of such initiations (15 in 
number) till 2008 according to the latest available WTO statistical report on Safeguard 
Initiations by Reporting Members. In India, the imposition of safeguard duties is 
authorized by the Customs Tariff Act, 1975
60 (hereinafter referred to as the Tariff Act), 
which provides, like its U.S. counterpart, no requirement whatsoever of “unforeseen 
development”. Furthermore, the duties of the Director General of Safeguards, as 
specified by the rules and regulations made under the Tariff Act, are limited to the 
finding of the existence of “serious injury” or threat thereof as a consequence of 
increased imports.
61 However, notwithstanding the fact that the Tariff Act does not 
mention the unforeseen developments requirement, the Director General of 
Safeguards is nonetheless obliged to demonstrate the existence of unforeseen 
developments for imposition of safeguard measures, in accordance with WTO 
Appellate Body interpretations. To date, no safeguard measure imposed by India has 
yet been challenged before the Appellate Body. However, it is the the opinion of the 
author that if such a challenge indeed comes into play, it is highly doubtful whether 
such measures would pass the test prescribed by the Appellate Body. 
Conclusion 
While it remains beyond doubt that the Uruguay Round negotiators did not 
include the first clause of Article XIX in Article 2.1 of the AS, the Appellate Body has 
nonetheless, through its precedents, fully revived the said clause. Academia in general 
seems to agree that revival of the unforeseen developments clause was a mistake from 
a purely legal point of view. The clause is too ambiguous to withstand scrutiny and it 
creates a considerable hurdle for WTO members who desire to use safeguard 
measures. Further, the clause has also lost meaning since its inception, considering the 
changes in the nature of negotiations and tariff reductions. The practice of product-by-
product negotiation is becoming obsolete in the context of the WTO. Hence, it is 
difficult for any country to prove why exactly it could not foresee during the 
negotiations a particular development that led to an increase in imports. The national 
laws of most regimes, for example the United States and even India, do not have this 
requirement. The draft version of the AS did contain the unforeseen developments 
clause. However, by the mid-nineties this clause was omitted while the other 
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conditions of Article XIX were repeated almost verbatim, as has been stated above. It 
ought to be mentioned here that both the EC and the United States had rejected this 
clause as being too difficult or restrictive for effective application. Even after the 
implementation of the AS, the demonstration of unforeseen developments has been 
omitted in the vast majority of safeguard applications since, thereby leading one to the 
suggestion that many members have not perceived the demonstration of unforeseen 
developments to be a legal requirement for the application of a safeguard measure. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that revival of the unforeseen developments clause by 
the Appellate Body was a legal mistake, and it should thus be removed from the 
discipline on safeguards. 
Nonetheless, since the Appellate Body decisions remain unchanged and applicable 
to future safeguard cases, members remain obligated to demonstrate the existence of 
unforeseen developments. Another probable solution is that the text of the AS could 
be amended to define “unforeseen developments”, or at least to outline the parameters 
of the term. Several scholarly opinions have been voiced regarding the feasibility of 
this solution. Sykes suggests that an event that is beyond the reasonable expectations 
of trade negotiators during the prior negotiating round could be an unforeseen 
development. Horn and Mavroidis, on the other hand, suggest that to qualify as an 
unforeseen development the event in question must be outside the control of the 
importing nation. Though these definitions/qualifications leave room for subjectivity, 
as long as the Appellate Body insists on unforeseen developments, defining this clause 
could be a possible way out. 
In conclusion, it may be said that the concept of the escape clause was always 
intended to be flexible, so as to allow for a case-by-case analysis. However, if 
safeguards are to be a workable remedy at all, the author sincerely believes that some 
guidelines urgently need to be laid down with respect to the requirement of unforeseen 
developments. Tilottama Raychaudhuri 
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